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3 edition of Strategic bargaining behavior, self-serving biases, and the role of expert agents found in the catalog.

Strategic bargaining behavior, self-serving biases, and the role of expert agents

Orley Ashenfelter

Strategic bargaining behavior, self-serving biases, and the role of expert agents

an empirical study of final-offer arbitration

by Orley Ashenfelter

  • 182 Want to read
  • 26 Currently reading

Published by National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, MA .
Written in English

    Subjects:
  • Arbitration and award -- Econometric models

  • Edition Notes

    StatementOrley Ashenfelter, Gordon B. Dahl.
    SeriesNBER working paper series -- working paper 11189., Working paper series (National Bureau of Economic Research) -- working paper no. 11189.
    ContributionsDahl, Gordon Boyack, 1968-, National Bureau of Economic Research.
    The Physical Object
    Pagination28, [18] p. :
    Number of Pages28
    ID Numbers
    Open LibraryOL17625938M
    OCLC/WorldCa58809917

    Mariusz Bratnicki, Wojciech Dyduch, Understanding Cognitive Biases in Strategic Decisions for Value Creation and Capture, Contemporary Challenges in Cooperation and Coopetition in the Age of Industry , /_19, (), (). ‘This volume provides an excellent collection of path-breaking work in negotiations, decision making, and conflict management research. It is an essential reference for the shelf of any researcher in these fields.’ – Guhan Subramanian, Harvard Law School, US ‘Max Bazerman has assembled an excellent collection of significant publications in this field.

      This individual’s job is to actively look for and point out biases as they come up to ensure the parties involved recognize bias and take new approaches to avoid it. 7. Fight bias .   1. Introduction. Nobel Prize winner Thomas Schelling introduced the concept of a focal point and described its role in coordination, bargaining and game theory in his seminal book The Strategy of Conflict (). A focal point is defined to be an outcome that is often chosen as the ”resting place” of a negotiation because it is somehow natural or special.

    Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and the Role of Expert Agents: An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc View citations (2) Also in Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section. 2 2 Key words: negotiation, bargaining, biases, ethics, affect, intuition, negotiation training Introduction In the early s, Cambridge, Massachusetts, was a hotspot on the negotiations front. Scholars from different disciplines started interacting with .


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Strategic bargaining behavior, self-serving biases, and the role of expert agents by Orley Ashenfelter Download PDF EPUB FB2

Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and the Role of Expert Agents: An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration Article   in   SSRN Electronic Journal   January. Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and the Role of Expert Agents: An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Self-serving biases Orley Ashenfelter Princeton University Gordon B.

Dahl* University of Rochester In this paper we study the complete evolution of a final-offer arbitration system used in New. Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and the Role of Expert Agents: An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration Orley Ashenfelter, Gordon B.

Dahl. NBER Working Paper No. Issued in March NBER Program(s):Labor Studies. Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and the Role of Expert Agents: An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration Author & abstract Download & other version.

Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and the Role of Expert Agents: An Empirical (). Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and the Role of Expert Agents: An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration NBER Working Paper No.

w Number of pages: 48 Posted: 08 Apr Last Revised: 30 Jul Cited by: 5. Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and the Role of Expert Agents: An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research. Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and the Role of Expert Agents: An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration.

Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of. Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases Linda Babcock and George Loewenstein A major unsolved riddle facing the social sciences is the cause of impasse in negotiations.

The consequences of impasse are evident in the amount of private and public resources spent on civil litigation, the costs of labor.

To rationalize, explain, or excuse the behavior - to verbalize some good, legitimate reason why this tactic was necessary. Promote candidness and honesty even at the expense of strategic advantage.

Bargaining is an aspect of social life, not isolated from society. Self-Serving Biases. Strategic bargaining behavior, self-serving biases, and the role of expert agents: an empirical study of final-offer arbitration Author: Orley Ashenfelter ; Gordon Boyack Dahl ; National Bureau of Economic Research.

Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and the Role of Expert Agents: An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration by Orley Ashenfelter & Gordon B. Dahl Evaluating the Role of Brown vs. Board of Education in School Equalization, Desegregation, and the Income of African Americans.

Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and the Role of Expert Agents An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration In this paper we study the complete evolution of a final-offer arbitration system used in New Jersey with data we have systematically collected over the year life of the program.

Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and the Role of Expert Agents: An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration Orley Ashenfelter and Gordon B. Dahl NBER Working Paper No. March JEL No. J5 ABSTRACT In this paper we study the complete evolution of a final-offer arbitration system used in New Jersey.

Get this from a library. Strategic bargaining behavior, self-serving biases, and the role of expert agents: an empirical study of final-offer arbitration. [Orley Ashenfelter; Gordon Boyack Dahl; National Bureau of Economic Research.] -- "In this paper we study the complete evolution of a final-offer arbitration system used in New Jersey with data we have systematically collected.

Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and the Role of Expert Agents: An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration By Orley Ashenfelter and Gordon B. Dahl Download PDF ( KB). Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and the Role of Expert Agents: An Empirical by Orley Ashenfelter, Gordon B.

Dahl, Orley Ashenfelter, Gordon B. Dahl - Princeton University,   One expert says although these biases are mostly natural to human behavior, they could negatively impact your investments. in their book. Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and the Role of Expert Agents: An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration.

Article. Jan ; Orley Ashenfelter; Gordon B. Dahl. of the biases residing in others, in strategic decision making leaders need to recognize their own biases.

So despite growing aware-ness of behavioral economics and numerous efforts by management writers, including ourselves, to make the case for its application, most executives have a justifiably difficult time knowing how to harness its power.

Strategic Bargaining Behavior, Self-Serving Biases, and the Role of Expert Agents: An Empirical Study of Final-Offer Arbitration NBER Working Paper No. w Number of pages: 48 Posted: 08 Apr Last Revised: 30 Jul 3. Bargaining Behavior • A sequential bargaining game • Predictions and actual behavior • Comparative statics of bargaining behavior • Fairness and the role of stake size • Best-shot versus ultimatum game • Proposer competition • Is a “sense of fairness” a human universal?Strategic bargaining behavior, self-serving biases, and the role of expert agents an empirical study of final-offer arbitration: Testing for price anomalies in real estate auctions: Theory and measurement: Using a hedonic model of solar radiation to assess the economic effect of climate change: the case of Mosel valley vineyards.